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ABSTRACT
The paper explores the phenomena of conflicting religious identities among Indo-
nesian politicians in Jakarta’s regional election (pilkada) in 2017. The 2017 most 
dramatized Jakarta regional election has been seen as a very important political 
phenomenon in recent time as it revealed the conflicting social-political identity 
construction across religious and ethnic groups in the region. This work attempts 
to provide explanation from the perspective of religious studies on the roles of re-
ligious identities in the political realm as well as religioous and political symbols 
as tools to achieve political supports. The case of Ahok mentioning one of the 
Qur’anic verses of al-Maidah 51 in Kepulauan Seribu exposes the fundamental 
question of wheter it is apart of blaspheming Islam and insulting ulama. It also 
shows how the Islamist groups respond to it by using the case of the politiciz-
ing al-Maidah 51 to reduce Ahok electability and disqualify him from political 
contestation by accusing him to blaspheme Islam. The complexity of applying 
Quranic texts to the modern political platform brings this article to outline how 
Muslim scholars interpret al-Maidah 51 and how they situate the text into the 
context of modern politics in Indonesia as well as how it influences the future of 
Indonesian democracy. 
Keywords: Religious identities, blasphemy, al-Maidah 51, Indonesia and 
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INTRODUCTION 
Religious identities play a pivotal role in the contemporary Indonesian 
politic landscape since the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, which has been 
marked by reinforcement of Islamist political movement. For three decades 
after taking over the country rule in the early 1970s, Suharto regime has 
1 The author would like to aknowledge the support by Politeknik Negeri Samarinda for 
this research-based article and expresses his deepest grattitute. It is also the intention of the 
author to credit the Annual International Conference on Islamic Studies (AICIS) 2017 orga-
nized by the Ministry of Religious Affair of the Republic of Indonesia in which the author was 
invited to present the paper. It was held in Jakarta on 22-25 November 2017
[  248  ]
AL ALBAB Volume 6 Number 2 December 2017
controlled Indonesian politics over Indonesian archipelagos and strained 
opposition resistance including Islamist faction (Assyaukanie, 2013; Aspinal, 
2005; Hamdi, Carnegie, & Smith, 2015). Ken Miichi (2006: 129) describes this 
strategy to disempower Islamist political movement and reactivates them as 
a puppet for encountering socio-political critics of human right violation and 
unsecured freedom. Since the New Orde’s fall, a new politics system has been 
constructed after a national reformation movement took place in 1998 lead by 
Muslim activists, lecturers and students. This political situation has provided 
open space for freedom and new democracy. In this new freedom all politic 
wings grow rapidly including the Islamist groups where they take advantage to 
strengthen and re-expand their political wings through parliament and non-
parliament. The rise of Islamist movements takes us back to similar situation in 
early independent 1950s, in which they focus on upholding syari’ah campaign 
like what Masyumi party strugled. In addition to that, the extremist group of 
Darul Islam and Indonesian Islamic Army (DI/TII) had struggled to reinstall 
Islamic state system (khilafah Islamiyah) instead of secular state of Pancasila 
(Effendey: 2003: 2: Platzdasch, 2009: 2).
The new era of Indonesian politics has been marked by reformation on political 
system and government bureaucracy followed by the assurance of civil rights 
and freedom, and equality (Hamdi, 2011). As I mention earlier, Islamist 
groups take part in contemporary politics contestation either in parliament 
or non-parliament. Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) 
is representing the fundamentalist Muslim voice in parliament. Together 
with Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang), PKS carries a great Islamic 
agenda in re-upholding sharia as Indonesian official law replacing secular law 
(Platzdasch, 2009: 337; Buehler, 2009: 59). From its political platform, PKS 
has been inspired a lot by Islamic fundamentalist party Ikwhanul Muslimin 
in Egypt through Al-Azhar University alumni, however it has transformed to 
a local politics and culture stetting of Indonesia. PKS has a solid constituent 
around 8.19% voters in 2004 and 6.79% in 2014 (Bawazir, 2015:210). PKS also 
runs education institution to regenerate young intellectual as well as young 
politicians. Most Islamist members from HTI, FPI, Muhammadiyah have 
affiliated to PKS party as supporters, even in some ways they have different 
approach to actualize Islamic state agenda. 
The article examines the role of Islamist groups in regional election politic 
of Indonesian capital Jakarta 2017, and the way they conflicted religious and 
ethnic identities. Politicizing religious and ethnic identities commonly occur 
as a propaganda strategy to win political contestation. The phenomenon 
of Jakarta regional election 2017 shows how religion and ethnic identities 
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have been played by the Islamist groups to resist and challenge non-Muslim 
leadership. They clearly use religion especially al-Maidah 51 to refuse a non-
Muslim leader by arguing that Islam has banned appointing a leader from 
non-Muslim in the majority of Islamic community (Lim, 2017:3; Hadiz, 2018: 
262). The Islamist figures such as Habib Rizieq, Al-khattat and Amin Rais rise 
up this issue by mobilizing mass for demonstration even demanded Ahok to 
fall down for his status as governor and stop him to be candidate in the next 
election.  In response to the pressures from Islamist groups, Ahok accidently 
mentioned al-Maidah 51 in his formal speech in Kepulauan Seribu said, “al-
Maidah 51 has been used by politicians to cheat other Muslim to support their 
political agenda, so do not want to be cheated by using al-Maidah 51 and so 
on, even you do not vote me do not worry, this project keeps continue until 
my contract finish”. This statement generates controversy and political drama 
after his video was cut and circulated by Buni Yani on YouTube. Yani put 
transcript and take off some word to stimulate anger emotion from Muslim 
community across Indonesia. 
Yani was successful accusing Ahok for blaspheming Islam and stimulating 
Muslim activist to a demonstration. Muslim activist come down to street 
protesting Ahok with the largest mass mobilization. Looking at this wild issue, 
his political opponents together with Islamist groups took advantage to carry 
this case into politics domain as religious capitalization of Jakarta election. 
The Islamist group accuses Ahok for blaspheming Quran and insulting ulema 
and this is the only way to defeat him in this regional election contestation. 
Therefore, Islamist groups give pressure to Indonesian police and president to 
detain him by mobilizing insistently the largest demonstration in Indonesian 
history called “the peace action of defending Islam 411 and 212”. They also 
warn the government, who are politically in coalition with Ahok, never 
protect and has to detain him. The government considers the Muslim voices 
by carrying this case to the state court in order to avoid Muslim revolution and 
violence action. After Indonesian Ulema Council release an attitude toward 
Ahok statement as part of blasphemy, the police put this case officially to the 
court (Lim, 2017: 4). How Muslim scholars respond to blasphemy accusation 
and how they interpret al-Maidah 51 will explore in next discussion. This 
case has been tremendous effect to Ahok politics career as minority, where he 
defeated for the second term and charged for penalty during two years in jail 
after the election. I believe that phsycological deminsion is also important in 
the case of convlict including religious groups (Lingren, 2016). For the latest, 
the deeper studies on the Ahok case is indeed needed as an addional to this 
work. 
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THE ANTI BLASPHEMY LAW AND POLITICIZING THE SACRED 
TEXT
Blasphemy cases on religion usually remain a big question and a social 
controversy not only in Indonesia, but also around the world. From human 
rights perspective, blasphemy transgresses the basic values of democracy in 
which provide freedom and equal right for all the people delivering critics 
and argument through writing and talking about socio-political phenomena 
including justice and religious symbol (Gubo, 2015:2-3). However, it was 
misunderstood and confused regarding the different element between insulting 
and critics to the sacred thing or symbol. If there is a new interpretation of the 
sacred text coming up deviates from orthodox discourse and understanding, 
it will be excluded, judged and accused for conducting blasphemy. Some have 
shown that because they have different interpretation of the sacred text to 
majority understanding, they have been called as “deviant”.2
Blasphemy is defined as the act of insulting or showing contempt to a 
deity, holy person and sacred things. Some religions in the world consider 
blasphemy as religious crime and there are anti-blasphemy law in 32 countries 
and hate speech laws in 87 countries that cover defamation of religion and 
public expression of hate against a religious group (Gubo, 2015: 4). Blasphemy 
law is common in Muslim majority nations such as those in the Middle East 
and North Africa, although they also present in Asia and some European 
countries. In the United Nations, blasphemy has become a critical issue for the 
21st century, when Islamic countries did a massive campaign for worldwide 
criminal penalties for the ‘defamation of religions’. However, the campaign 
ended in 2011 when the proposal withdrawn in Geneva, in the human rights 
council because of lack support (Council of Europe, 2010: 11).
Anti-blasphemy law in Indonesia is part of colonial inheritance law. Originally 
it is not related to religious defamation, rather than protection law for the Dutch 
people from local resistance following challenges toward colonial authority. 
However, 1965 Sukarno has been repressed by conservative Muslim groups to 
develop anti-blasphemy law from the Dutch law for the protection of religious 
purity and reduction of religious deviance (heresy) practices. Sukarno gave 
attention to the conservative voices due to the vulnerability of religion under 
the significant proliferation of spiritual movements (aliran kepercayaan) 
across Indonesian islands, that able generate a negative effect to fundamental 
structure of Islamic religiosity. In response to the demand of conservative 
2 See the wokk by Prasojo (2017) for the case of ethnic and religious group relation 
in West Kalimantan consisting of Tionghua, Dayak and Malay. See also the works by Ernas 
(2016) and Rumahuru (2016) for the case of inter-religious relation in Ambon consisting of 
Muslim and Christian.
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voices Sukarno creates Presidential Decree No. 1/PNPS/1965 anti-blasphemy 
law that consist of two articles 156 and 156a. However, the anti- blasphemy 
often abused to repress and disempower the minority group; even now it is 
used for achieving political interest including in regional elections process 
(Crouch, 2012: 2; Legal, 2017: 4).
Suharto transformed Presidential Decree 1965 of religious blasphemy to be 
official constitution or Undang-undang No. 09/1969 to prevent social dispute 
and protect the state stability. Indeed, Suharto often abused the blasphemy 
constitution, especially the article 165 and 165a to protect his regime authority 
from critics and resistances. In several cases, Suharto applied an aggressive 
policy attacking Muslim activist, including Tanjung Priok case 1984, where 
military member shoot demonstrators in Tanjung Priok harbor. This precedent 
started by activists who protested upon apprehension of their colleagues after 
little dispute with military member who come in to the mosque without taking 
his shoes.     
Blasphemy becomes national debate after Ahok statement accused as 
insulting ulema and the Quran. It attracted national attention because Ahok 
is governor of Indonesian capital and one of the most controversial leaders 
in contemporary Indonesian politic. His reformation agenda for a clean and 
professional government inflicts cultural shock not only for the staffs, but also 
for the communities, who are not ready to accept his idea of changes and 
transformations. So, I argue that this blasphemy case is a big design to fall him 
dawn as governor and dissuades him for the next election. Far away before 
the regional election takes place in Jakarta, Islamist groups especially FPI has 
been protested to his inauguration as governor after Jokowi jumps to president 
chair. By carrying religious and ethnic identities as legitimacy to disempower 
Ahok authority and delegitimize a non-Muslim leadership is the only way to 
get him dawn (Hadiz, 2018: 263). 
Blasphemy is a key to reduce Ahok electability that four month before has 
reached over 60%. Even he did not mention al-Maidah 51 for instants, he 
already accused to blaspheme Islam because he is not Muslim and banned 
to be leader in the majority of Islamic community base on al-Maidah 51. 
Defamation issue has taken place for a long time since he became mayor 
in East Belitung and governor candidate in the Banka Belitung province in 
regional election 2007 (Ginting, 2008: 40). Another fact shows that Ahok 
has been defied by Islamist groups in Jakarta when he accompanied Jokowi 
in the previous Jakarta election 2012. Al-Maidah 51 has been spread out to 
ignore Ahok and Jokowi duet due to his different religiosity and ethnicity. For 
a decade, al-Maidah 51 becomes a political verse in several regional elections 
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that often appears during the campaign process and disappears in the end of 
the election(Hadiz, 2018: 264).
During regional election of Jakarta, the Islamist groups use blasphemy issue 
as demonstration moment. The largest mass mobilization called 411 and 
212 in 2016 presented by Muslim across Indonesian archipelago. Around 1 
million people down to street for a long march from Istiqlal mosque to the 
National Monument, Bundaran HI, then to president palace demanding 
Jokowi to detain Ahok. The movement of 411 was attended by some religious 
figures, artists and politicians, including A. A Gym, Fadly Zon, Fahri Hamzah, 
Ahmad Dani, and Amin Rais. Politically, those figures are opposition to 
Jokowi’s government, where they come from a different political party. At that 
demonstration protesters appeal a meeting with Jokowi to discuss about Ahok 
case, but no response from him and he chooses to leave the palace and ignore 
those demands. Because they failed to see Jokowi those protesters attack the 
police and make chaos and violence. There are groups of motorbike gangster 
in many spot around demonstration area goes to robbery targeting Chinese 
stores. The same schema in the following demonstration action called 212, 
presented by mass around 700.000-1.5 million people. At this time, Jokowi 
and Yusuf Kala decide to see those demonstrators and give a short speech 
to calm down their emotional and appreciate the peace commitment for 
demonstration process(Lim, 2017: 3). 
Under a strong pressure finally Ahok delivers a deep sorry through media for 
his mistaken statement in Kepulauan Seribu. He explains that he has no aim 
to insult ulame or blaspheme the Quran, it is a pure critic to Muslim politician 
who often abuse the Quran as weapon of politics goal. Ahok emphasizes that 
there are some politicians play this issue to disqualify him for the next Jakarta 
election. It is not making sense for me to blaspheme Islamic symbol, while 
the majority of my supporters are Muslim, Ahok said. He shows his effort to 
help Muslim people to Mekkah for hajj and build religious facilities such as 
mosques. After the police carried this case to official court it influences his 
electability. Ahok has to undergo the blasphemy trial in the court during his 
campaign time and face horrified experience in the field. Anywhere he and 
the team socialize his program during the campaign; he has been refused and 
attacked by certain group systematically. 
THE VERSE OF PILKADA: CHALLENGING AN ORTHODOX 
 INTERPRETATION
Ahok is a new phenomenon of Indonesian modern politician leader together 
with Jokowi, promoting mental revolution and anti-corruption. They have 
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strong chemistry as politician pairs where Jokowi is well known with his down-
to-earth character, hard worker, and close to people, while Ahok is assertive, 
reasonable, and professional (Hamid, 2012: 335; Prasetyo, 2014: 3; Mulyadi, 
2016: 130). Jokowi encourages respecting plurality and diversity as well as 
equality rights among Indonesian, including the engagement for minority 
group in country development process. His political approach made Jokowi as 
one of young successful leaders in contemporary Indonesian politics. In 2010, 
Jokowi-and FX Hadi Rudyatmo reach 90.09% voters for the second election 
term in Solo. No resistance from Islamist group regarding Jokowi’s politics 
step in Solo engaging non-Muslim politician as vice mayor (Prasetyo, 2014: 8). 
Different situation in Jakarta election, he experiences a serious challenge from 
Islamist groups that rejected his idea choosing a Christian politic background. 
Ahok is becoming an object for religious critics refer to textual interpretation 
of al-Maidah 51. 
Even there is a strong ignorance of Ahok status, the Islamist groups cannot 
override him from governor chair following the Indonesian constitution. 
However, the engagement of Islamist political domain has generated a social-
political drama not only in Jakarta election, but also in all over Indonesian 
archipelagos as the result of media exposure. The battle of political ideology 
and religious identity extremely happens when Ahok replaces Jokowi 
as governor after winning the presidential election in 2014. During the 
presidential election campaign, Jokowi also experiences the attack through 
social media, where they were questioning his religious and ethnic identities. 
They accused him as a Christian and Chinese decedent blood. The rumor has 
been outbreak to Jokowi family’s political identity that indicates partisan of 
Indonesian Communist Party member in 1960s. At the same time Islamist 
group continue to challenge Ahok new status as governor by mobilization of 
militia to stop his inauguration by president (Lim, 2017: 4).
In order to understand the reason why Islamist groups were challenging Ahok 
authority and accusing blasphemy, we need to explore the way they understand 
and interpret al-Maidah 51. Al-Maidah 51 has been public discourse and 
national debate not only related to its contents, but also its interpretation 
when it was connected to contemporary context of Indonesian politics and 
its compatibility in implementation in the new democracy system. This verse 
unfolds the controversy and more complex question in modern politics 
era especially in the plural community, where Muslim is minority group. It 
is potential to politicize for achieving political interest by certain group of 
Muslim who used to stand behind the Quran. In fact, al-Maidah 51 is well 
known special verse of Pilkada, which often appears when the regional election 
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event comes and disappears when it finish. In doing so, this article examines 
the plurality of al-Maidah 51 interpretations among Muslims scholars and 
how they contextualize it in modern democracy (Lim, 2017:6-7). 
Ahok was blamed for his comment about al-Maidah 51 as assaults the 
Quran and insults ulama, however he believes it is purely a critic for bad 
manner of Muslim politician who abusing the Quran to support their 
political agenda. Ahok tries to challenge the orthodox interpretation of al-
Maidah 51 by following Gusdur interpretation that opposite to orthodox 
understanding. Gusdur is a charismatic and a pluralist figure from traditional 
organization Nahdlatul Ulama, who protect minority group from violence 
and discrimination. Gusdur is Ahok spiritual teacher and politics advisor 
since they made contact to collaborate in previous regional election of Banka 
Belitung, in which PKB party support Ahok. The reason Gusdur assisted 
him because his achievement program during to be mayor in East Belitung 
2005-2006. Al-Maidah 51 has been erupted during the process of political 
campaign in that regional election, in which directly influence the grade of 
Ahok electability. Ahok and Eko Cahyono lost in this Pilkada contestation. 
According to Eko al-Maidah 51 becomes tsunami attack for him and Ahok 
it was used as a political weapon. Al-Maidah 51 disseminated as religious 
propaganda refusing on-Muslim leadership.3 The Muslim candidate use kyais 
to spread out this propaganda agitating other Muslims to vote candidate from 
the same religion. So, what happen was the current case of Ahok in Jakarta is 
repetition from previous experience. 
There are varied interpretations of al-Maidah 51 among Muslim scholars 
in response to Ahok case. The word aulia in al-Maidah 51 is main objet for 
the discussion and argument related to the meaning and the connection to 
the modern political context. Gusdur said, al-Maidah 51 did not relate to 
leadership matter, rather a critic and warning to the unethical manner from 
Muhammad friend who want to fracture Islamic community by creating 
alliance with non-Muslim including the Christians and the Jews. This is the 
reason why this verse down through to remind Muhammad of his potential 
internal enemy. According to Gusdur Ahok has no bad intention like what it 
shows in this verse, on the contrary he made a good relation to Muslim people 
and has adopted father from Muslim family. He cares upon Muslim necessities 
even he is Christian leader. He prioritizes all the Muslim needs like building 
mosque and fellowship for hajj. So, it is wrong to use this verse for targeting 
3 See http://medan.tribunnews.com/2017/03/07/pernah-kalah-saat-jadi-
duet-cagub-cawagub-ini-kesaksian-eko-cahyono-soal-ahok-yang-mengejut-
kan?page=2, downloaded in March 7, 2017.
[  255  ]
AL ALBAB Volume 6 Number 2 December 2017
Ahok in order to achieve the politics interest, Gusdur said.    
Nazarudin Umar, a great Imam of Istiqlal mosque and professor in State 
Islamic University of Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta re-strengthens Gusdur 
interpretation on al-Maidah 51. In a special interview by private channel 
TVOne 2016 Umar states that there are various interpretations of Al-Maidah 
51 from Muslim scholars, but no one translates auliya as a leader either in 
English or Arabic book of interpretation. He said, there are 10 translations 
of the Quran he had read including English translation by Abdullah Yusuf 
Ali where he translates auliya as protector, close friends and alliance. Only a 
translation from Ministry of Religious Affair translates auliya as a leader. In 
his opinion, it was influenced a misleading of understanding by Muslim about 
this verse. However, he deplores Ahok statement mentioned al-Maidah 51 that 
probably was causing a hurt for Muslim. He suggests let Muslim interpret their 
own sacred text even there are many approaches to understand the meaning 
of auliya in Al-Maidah 51. He also criticizes the single approach by Islamist 
interpretation of auliya as a leader, which has socio-political consequences 
especially for minority groups. 
The same opinion by Qurays Shihab, a prominent Muslim scholar for Quranic 
interpretation said, auliya does not mean a leader in this context, but mean 
protector, alliance or close friend. Close friend mean the one who has access to 
the secret matter and the private information like mayor closes to his people; 
marriage guardian wali nikah closes to his daughter. He illustrates a leader 
like a pilot, we choose based on capability, not identity. Which one will will 
choose non-Muslim pilot with a great experience and was a senior or Muslim 
pilot with a poor experience and still junior. Emha Ainun Najib challenges 
the Islamist judgment about Ahok as “kafir”. According to Najib Ahok is not 
kafir because he believes in God and admires the truth of Quran, even he 
criticize his own religious tradition as irrational religion. So, he is not kefir but 
hypocrite or shirk, Najib said. He also questions the Islamist attitude refusing 
Ahok as governor candidate of Jakarta in the next election, while he is already 
our governor now. 
Syafi’i Maarif and Mustofa Bisri interpret al-Maidah 51 in a moderate way 
saying that this verse is not connected directly to leadership matter. They believe 
no harm for Muslim to vote non-Muslim leader especially in the modern 
political context if they have ability. The verse of al-Maidah 51 come down 
in war situation where not allowed to made alliance with enemies because 
could endanger Muslim itself. So, we cannot use this verse as legitimacy 
and weapon for politics agenda. They see Ahok statement as deep critics to 
Muslim politician being unethical, hypocrite and corrupted. They suggest 
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forgiving Ahok after him apologies and regret to his comment. Informal 
Ahok’s spokesmen during Jakarta election, Nusron Wahid commented on the 
blasphemy case of al-Maidah 51 as political trick and strongly connected to 
Jakarta election. Nothing to do with blasphemy, it just the way to decrees Ahok 
electability. Nusron argues, Ahok is not the only Christian governor in the 
Muslim history; it existed since Islamic kingdom era, where some Christian 
figures sit in a strategic position including as governor. So, he challenges the 
orthodox interpretation of al-Maidah 51 that no more suitable upon modern 
political context.
Habib Rizieq, the head of FPI accused those Muslim scholars and ulame who 
support Ahok leadership as zindiq and hypocrite. Rizieq regrets with their 
efforts of misleading the real al-Maidah 51 interpretations to fit with their 
interest. He explains even the meaning of auliyah varies including alliance, 
close friend, protector, and leader, but it is not fair to take only one meaning 
to suit politics interest and withdraw others. We need to see the local context 
base one religious guidance where Jakarta population is the majority of 
Muslim. He believed, the true meaning of auliya in Indonesian context is 
“leaders”. So, allowing non-Muslim to be a leader in the majority of Muslim 
community, including as governor is a deviant teaching of Islam. Similar 
opinion from Yunahar Ilyas, Muhammadiyah scholar said, non-Muslim is 
prohibited to be leader in a majority Muslim community. Not only al-Maidah 
51 clearly discusses about this issue, but also in other verses of Quran that 
banned non-Muslim leadership. He refers the story of Umar bin Khattab, who 
was angry upon the attitude governor of Musa Al-Asyari appointing non-
Muslim as accountant. Musa al-Asyari was invited for report presentation on 
his financial administration in front of Umar and the result was good and 
impressive. Umar asked to see his accountant, but Asyari refuses to take him 
because he is Christian. He was angry to Al-Asyari because of this issue. 
Saik Aqil Husin al-Munawar, ex-ministry of Indonesian religious affair 
emphasizes the textual meaning of Al-Maidah 51 that clearly has banned non-
Muslim (Jews and Christian) to be leader in a majority Muslim community. 
No need to reinterpret this verse because it has a clear meaning. There is a 
prohibition word in this text by using proposition “la” in the beginning of 
sentence which means “no”. He understood it had banned not only on 
leadership matter, but also supporting or asking assistance from both groups. 
AA Gym, a charismatic cleric from West Java believes that auliya has plural 
meaning including a leader. For Indonesian context the meaning of auliya 
more contextual toward leadership because we are the majority group, he said. 
He expresses his disappointment to Ahok statement that was assaulted Islamic 
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values and played sacred symbol. It was really hurt for us, but we have to pray 
for him to get guidance or hidayah, AA Gym said.
From those different interpretations about al-Maidah 51 above, at least there 
are two groups have contested the discourses related to Muslim response on 
leadership status of non-Muslim in majority group. The first group follows 
orthodox ways using a normative interpretation of the text. They understand 
the text literally as a reference without considering the current local context. 
FPI, HTI, FUI, Muhammadiyah, and PKS are part of this group representing 
the orthodox way; even not all members have the same interpretation, but the 
majority of them are. The second group is the challenger of orthodox method 
and promotes heterodox way to contextualize the text to the current social-
political reality. This group represented by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) scholars, 
the majority of Muslim organization in Indonesia. The young scholars of 
NU such as Zuhairi Misrawi, Guntur Ramli and Nuron Wahid promotes a 
new method to understand the text. Their opinion some time creates a social 
controversy in the society due to negative response from the majority group 
that used to refer a traditional and orthodox way. Zuhairi Misrawi for instance 
stated, no significant influence by Ahok statement destroy our belief. So, we 
cannot accuse him blaspheming Quran and insulting ulame only because of 
this instant statement. Misrawi said, his statement intend to criticizes the bad 
behavior of Muslim politician using religious symbol for personal and group 
interest. Al-Maidah 51 is the verse of war, so it is difficult to apply literally in 
the new modern Indonesian democracy and politics context. He believes the 
main reason of anti Ahok rises up this issue only because he is clean, honest 
and anti-corruption, so no space for them to corrupt. 
It is very important to say here that there is misunderstanding upon Ahok 
thought, especially the way he think and hold his commitment to a clean 
bureaucracy. Ahok is a very critical thinker and talk philosophical way to 
analyze the socio-political reality. However, not everybody can accept his way 
of thinking and uncomfortable to hear deep critics. In addition, Ahok is a 
brave person to say openly what he wants and refuses things do not make 
sense. His book about “Mengubah Indoenesia” is representation the way he 
thinks and applies highly religious ethics in practice for policy making and 
decision. In that book he already mention al-Maidah 51 base on his experience 
in the previous regional election of Bangka Belitung 2007, in which he was 
attacked by this verse during campaign time and make him loss in that regional 
contestation (Ginting (at.al), 2008). 
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THE FUTURE OF INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY
The future of Indonesian democracy recently is in a serious vulnerability and 
challenges by the emergence of Islamist groups that play a significant role in 
the new Indonesian political landscape. In fact, the presence of Islamist group 
is causing social and political turbulence shaking Indonesian stability by 
carrying identities of religion and ethnic in conflict. Since they problematize 
Ahok status as vice governor of Jakarta province 2012 and governor in 2014, 
the conflict of religious and ethnic identities is stronger and more sensitive 
especially between Christianity and Islam. This conflict is not purely about 
religion but more about politics interest and election contestation that carries 
religious symbol on war. The culmination of this conflict has been visible 
clearly when the Islamist group challenges Ahok decision as candidate of 
Jakarta in regional election 2017 with Djarot Saiful Hidayat, who supported 
by PDIP, Golkar, Nadem and Hanura. 
The tension between majority and minority group is sharper after Ahok 
accused guilty on blasphemy case by state court and had been punished for 
two years detained. It was a long process since he charged assaulting Islam, 
Quran and ulame after delivering formal speech, in which follow by the largest 
religio-politics demonstration called 411 and 212 lead by FPI. This penalty has 
big impact on social relation stability among Indonesian that put a fractured 
in national level. Indonesian people including national figures divided and 
fractured in two groups. Physical and non-physical identity conflicts take 
place not only in Jakarta, but also in some places where various persecutions 
happen toward respective fanatic followers. The war is more visible through 
social media assaulting another figure and praising their own. Ahokers have 
been persecuted by FPI militia members because they have assaulted the FPI 
imam, Habib Rizieq, a main actor behind the fall of Ahok authority. The same 
event takes place upon certain religious figures, which insult and condemns 
Ahok excessively. MUI members and politicians who are “anti Ahok” had 
been refused by local community when they visit to other provinces such as 
Papua, West Kalimantan, Maluku and East Nusa Tenggara, and Bali where 
non-Muslim is the majority. 
The secretary of MUI, Tengku Zulkarnain was attacked right when he come 
down from the plane in his visit for da’wa in Sintang, Pontianak January 12, 
2017. The Dayak community refused his attendance in Pontianak by holding 
banner states that “We are kafir, this is our land and the kafir land, so do not 
come here”. This sentence is an expression to resist his racism attitude toward 
minority in social media.4  They also demand the government to dissolve 
4 See https://nasional.tempo.co/read/835563/begini- penghadangan-
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FPI and other radical organization that was actively campaign for intolerant, 
violence, anti-Pancasila and anti-constitution of Indonesia. Jonru and Fakhri 
Hamzah also ignored by local community in their visit because of racism and 
brutal comment and hatred worldwide on social media. In his social activities 
in Sikka, Flores, East Nusa Tenggara Jonru aims to help poor people especially 
muallaf people (the new Muslim convertor), however local communities 
stop him and protest his attendance following his discriminative comment in 
social media. Fakhri Hamzah, PKS politician also was refused in Manado by a 
hundred people who are disappointed to his political attitude. The airport was 
surrounded to look for him and push him to return to Jakarta. The protestors 
yell at him said that no place for provocative people in Manado land. The 
police evacuated Hamzah from mass attack and take him to the event he 
has to present. However, Hamzah decides to return before the event close to 
anticipate the next demonstration.5 
The female doctor Fiera Lovita from Solok, West Sumatra identified as Ahoker 
updated a new status on her Facebook making comment about sex scandal of 
the great Imam, Habib Rizieq. As soon as possible FPI militias come to her 
house and intimidate her through verbal violence demanding official sorry 
for what she said in her Facebook. After negotiation with FPI members, she 
was asked for writing an official letter for saying sorry and regrets comment 
and never repeats it again. FPI members in West Sumatera will take action 
until she acknowledged her mistake and write special letter. Even she wrote 
a letter FPI members are not satisfied and still intimidate her by spreading 
agitation on Facebook accused her deliberately insulting ulame and Islam. 
She was suffered from this event and asks mutation to another place to save 
her children from mental damage. Another persecution on video circulates in 
YuTube, where a teenager has been tortured by FPI members after defamation 
FPI top leader about his porn chat scandal. Five members from FPI have done 
serious interrogation and strike his face and shake his head. They guide him 
to say sorry for what he was done and never repeat it again. This interrogation 
takes place in the middle of the night by aggressive and violence approach 
under recorded camera. His mother just surrenders watching this event and 
unable to protect her son. However, the police quickly remove him and arrest 
those FPI members charged for child violence.     
Those mentioned events show that Indonesian democracy and freedom are on 
threaten as the result of religious and ethnic interfering in the politics realm. 
mui-dan-fpi-oleh-warga-dayak-di-sintang, January 15, 2017.
5 https://regional.kompas.com/read/2017/05/14/08135951/kenapa.
fahri.hamzah.ditolak.di.manado, Mei 15, 2017.
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The conflict identities have injured the values of Indonesian democracy by 
polarization of Indonesian citizen base on religious and ethnic orientation. It 
is the biggest challenges of Indonesian current democracy, where the Islamist 
put identities in conflict and violates the Indonesian constitution of Pancasila 
in such all citizens are equal in allover spaces. Islam and Pancasila have a strong 
connection and can stand side by side without withdrawing one and another. 
However, The Islamist groups still imagine replacing Pancasila by Islamic 
syari’ah through upholding Islamic State as the best solution for Indonesian 
problems of nationhood. The strength of Islamist political movements after 
Ahok defeat in Jakarta’s election is the signal of the serious threat of Indonesian 
future of democracy where they are not only voices an Islamic syari’ah, but 
also attacking the minority group in politics rights.     
CONCLUSION
The conflict of identities among Indonesians d has become stronger after Ahok 
was charged a penalty for two years detained related to his formal speech in 
Kepulauan Seribu mentioned al-Maidah 51 as a tool for political conspiracy to 
defeat minority candidate. For some Muslims the critic is normal but for some 
other groups they would understand that the critic is a form of blasphemy to 
Islamic symbol and ulame. Ahok is accused for taking too far the sacred text 
in which it is not his domain as non-Muslim, even though his reason to do it is 
as a reaction to high pressure from Islamist group by carrying this verse. Ahok 
defends himself with say no intention to blaspheme Islamic symbol, just to 
remind Muslim politicians that they should play fairly and not to use religious 
symbol for political interests. 
Al-Maidah 51 is a potential verse to be politicized by Muslim politicians 
in each election moment especially contested to non-Muslim candidate. It 
happens in regional election of Jakarta 2017 where Ahok is political enemy 
for conservative Muslim politicians. Previously, this verse was also used by 
politician in regional election of Bangka Belitung 2007 when Ahok became 
candidate from a minority group. So, it is difficult to conclude that this case 
is purely blasphemy on Islamic symbol and insult ulame because of the 
subjectivity to interpret the phenomenon. This case cannot be separated 
from the political context where there are groups of fundamentalist Muslims 
disagree to a leadership position of non-Muslim in the community of Islamic 
as majority. If they are consistent to this attitude, they should apply al-Maidah 
51 in another region, not only in Jakarata.
The interpretations about al-Maidah 51 show the plurality and diversity of 
understanding of its content and context. The central debate is on the meaning 
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of “auliya” word that influence to social-political practice. Some scholars give 
a meaning of auliya as close friend and alliance, and some mean it as leader. 
But the majority of scholars understand auliya as a close friend or alliance. In 
Indonesian context the basic question is how is al-Maidah 51 compatible with 
Indonesian constitution and democracy system that guarantees to everyone 
has equal right to vote and be voted? This verse is easy to use for personal 
and group political interests in the name of Islam. It is wise to conclude that 
Indomesian Muslims need to re-contextualize it to be more suitable with 
Indonesian constitution and democracy system.  
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